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The catchableness of a fly ball depends on whether the catcher can get to the ball in time;
accurate judgments of catchableness must reflect both spatial and temporal aspects. Two
experiments examined the perception of catchableness under conditions of restricted infor-
mation pickup. Experiment 1 compared perceptual judgments with actual catching and
revealed that stationary observers are poor perceivers of catchableness, as would be expected
by the lack of information about running capabilities. In Experiment 2, participants saw the
1st part of ball trajectories before their vision was occluded. In 1 condition, they started to run
(as if to catch the ball) before occlusion; in another, they remained stationary. Moving
judgments were better than stationary judgments. This supports the idea that perceiving
affordances that depend on kinematic, rather than merely geometric, body characteristics may
require the relevant action to be performed.
One of the assumptions of ecological psychology is that
the environment is perceived in animal-relevant terms, that
is, in terms of what the animal can do with and in the
environment. Perception is seen as an active pickup of
meaningful information that specifies the behavioral possi-
bilities of the environment, also called affordances. These
affordances (Gibson, 1979/1986) are the possibilities for
action offered by the environment and the events that occur
in it, described with respect to and in terms of the perceiving
and acting animal. Ecological psychology claims that it is
important for animals to perceive these affordances, so that
the control of behavior can be adjusted to the possibilities
for action that are supported by the environment.
Most of the affordances that have been derived and in-
vestigated have concerned geometric relations between ob-
server and environment (Carello, Grosofsky, Reichel,
Solomon, & Turvey, 1989; Mark, 1987; Mark, Balliett,
Graver, Douglas, & Fox, 1990; Mark & Vogele, 1987;
Warren, 1984; Warren & Whang, 1987). That research
shows that the perception of affordances, such as the climb-
ableness of stairs, is body scaled. Observers perceive envi-
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ronmental properties in terms of their own body dimen-
sions.
Although emphasis has been on geometric units, it is clear
that affordances can also depend on time, so that not only
geometric but also kinematic (spatiotemporal) relations play
a role (Warren & Whang, 1987). Such affordances can be
found, for example, in traffic situations such as crossing a
busy street, where not only the to-be-crossed distance is
important but also the time mat is available for covering this
distance safely (Demetre et al., 1992; Lee, Young, &
McLaughlin, 1984; Young & Lee, 1987). Whether a traffic
situation affords safe stopping by braking, as discussed by
Lee (1976) and Stewart, Cudworth, and Lishman (1993),
provides another example of such an affordance. In fact, in
any situation in which a certain distance is to be covered in
a specific time, the affordance can be described in kinematic
terms. Therefore, in sports, in which players have to receive
passes or catch fly balls, examples abound. Again, the
catchableness of a baseball or a football depends not only on
the distance that is to be covered but also on the time that is
available for covering this distance.
Bootsma, Bakker, van Snippenberg, and Tdlohreg (1992)
and Peper, Bootsma, Mestre, and Bakker (1994) have al-
ready investigated the perception of catchableness of balls
passing the observer laterally. In the situation they exam-
ined, ball catching required lateral hand movement only,
without sideward bending or locomoting. With respect to
this task, scaling to arm length is sufficient, and observers'
judgments of critical passing distance appeared reasonably
accurate.
The focus of this article is on the perception of catchable-
ness of fly balls projected in the sagittal plane of the catcher,
the catching of which usually requires locomotion. To catch
a fly ball in baseball, the fielder must gear his or her
locomotory actions to the information from the flight of the
ball in such a way as to arrive at the landing site at or before
the time the ball arrives. The boundary that separates catch-
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able and not catchable depends on the locomotory capabil-
ities (speed and acceleration) of the would-be catcher.
Hence, pure body scaling is not sufficient. Describing the
boundary of catchableness in terms of, for instance, eye
height, where this boundary is, say, three eye heights away,
does not solve the problem. Instead, the boundary must be
described both in terms of the distance and the available
time, that is, in terms of the speed (distance divided by
time), acceleration (twice the distance divided by time
squared), or both of the catcher's running. In other words,
whether a ball is catchable depends on the actions the
catcher-perceiver can develop, not his or her eye height, leg
length, or arm length (even though they are surely correlat-
ed). Only if action scaling occurs is there- a commensura-
bility between the affordance, a property of the environ-
ment, and the effectivity, the complementary property of the
animal (Shaw, Turvey, & Mace, 1982; Turvey, 1992).
An interesting question with respect to this action scaling
is whether perceptual information about the boundary of
catchableness is available when an observer is standing still,
that is, when the observer is not performing the (in this case,
locomotory) action. Let us work out the details of this issue
with respect to vertical optical acceleration, a potential
information source in the fly ball situation in which there is
no lateral motion of the ball relative to the catcher. Vertical
optical acceleration is the acceleration of the projection of
the center of the ball on a vertical image plane and tells the
catcher what action is necessary to catch the ball (see
Appendix for details). The sign of vertical optical acceler-
ation specifies the direction (forward or backward) in which
the catcher should accelerate (Babler & Dannemiller, 1993;
Chapman, 1968; Michaels & Oudejans, 1992; McLeod &
Dienes, 1993). Getting and keeping vertical optical accel-
eration near zero (that is, below the detection threshold; see
Babler & Dannemiller, 1993) during the entire ball flight
will bring the catcher to the right place at the right time to
intercept the ball. It is our working assumption that the
informational value of optical acceleration is based purely
on its presence (values above the detection threshold) or
absence (values below the detection threshold).1 No optical
acceleration means that the catcher is on a collision course
with the ball; the presence of optical acceleration indicates
that the catcher should adjust his or her movements (accel-
erate forward or backward depending on the sign of the
acceleration). Thus, the catcher need not predict the landing
location of the ball to make the catch; he or she need simply
monitor the presence or absence of optical acceleration and
act accordingly.
Although an elegant source for the guidance of locomo-
tion toward the future landing location of the ball, it seems
unlikely that optical acceleration provides information
about the boundary of catchableness when the observer is
standing still. Leaving aside the situation in which the
observer is standing still and optical acceleration is zero
(specifying that the ball will arrive at the eye and is there-
fore catchable), catchableness is not specified by optical
acceleration when the observer is stationary. To catch balls
that do not land at the catcher's initial position, movement
is necessary. To scale the trajectory against possible actions,
it must be the case that information about both is available,
either from perceptual information alone or from perceptual
information combined with knowledge from memory.
Rather than assuming the latter, we agree with Mark et al.
(1990) that actors determine their capabilities anew each
time they perform an action. They do so by picking up
information about their capabilities, relative to the environ-
ment, that is revealed by their own actions (Mark et al.,
1990).
We propose that specification of catchableness on the
basis of vertical optical acceleration occurs as follows. An
optical acceleration of zero (below the detection threshold)
at a certain moment informs the catcher that the ball is
catchable, assuming that he or she can maintain the current
running speed (though see a proviso in the Appendix). In
contrast, if the catcher has reached maximum running speed
and optical acceleration is still not zero (not below the
detection threshold), this informs the catcher that the ball is
not catchable. These two situations elucidate the relational
character of optical acceleration, showing that optical ac-
celeration is neither about ball trajectories nor about action
possibilities but about their combination. It informs about
the motion of the ball relative to the locomotory actions of
the catcher. Thus, with respect to balls that do not land at the
initial position of the catcher, which balls are catchable and
which are not is specified only when a catcher is running.
Whereas the actual catchableness of a fly ball is depen-
dent on both distance and time, it remains to be seen
whether perceptual judgments of catchableness also reflect
both of these variables. It is possible that judgments of
catchableness reflect distance alone—the edge of catchable-
ness is seen at a certain distance away, as shown in Figure
1A, in which the division of space-time into catchable and
noncatchable regions would be determined by this specific
critical distance. Judgments of catchableness could also
reflect both distance and time, as is the case when scaling
takes place according to, say, the average running speed that
should be developed; here the critical value would be a ratio
of landing distance to flight time (Figure IB). Another
possibility is that judgments reflect the possible acceleration
of the observer, in which the critical ratio is twice the
distance divided by flight time squared (Figure 1C). In both
of these latter cases, there is some critical value, either the
maximum average running speed or the maximum acceler-
ation, that segments space-time into catchable and non-
catchable regions. Thus, if on the basis of the distance-time
combination of a certain ball, the required running speed or
acceleration exceeds the possible running speed or acceler-
ation, the ball in question is not catchable. As mentioned,
the dependence of actual catching on such factors as accel-
1
 We do not believe that actual value of optical acceleration is
informative, because of its ambiguity with respect to landing
location; trajectories with different values of optical acceleration,
given different heights and trajectories (see Appendix Equation
A3), can still lead to the same landing position. Thus, even if
perceivers could discriminate between different values of optical
acceleration, this would not be useful for predicting where the ball
will land.
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Figure 1. The division of space-time into catchable and not-
catchable regions by either distance (A, distance = 4), velocity (B,
distance = 3 • time2), or acceleration (C, distance = 2 • time2).
These values were arbitrarily chosen.
eration may or may not be reflected in perceptual judg-
ments.
The overall goal of the present study was to test whether
or not, in the case of this "kinematic" affordance, catchable-
ness, perceptual information about the perceiver's own ac-
tions has to be available for this affordance to be perceived.
In other words, is it possible for an observer to perceive
catchableness accurately without performing the required
action, as it appears to be for affordances for which geo-
metric scaling is appropriate?
Experiment 1
Experiment 1 examined whether stationary observers,
despite the fact that vertical optical acceleration does not
specify catchableness to them, can accurately perceive
catchableness, perhaps on the basis of other optical infor-
mation or on the basis of perceptual information in combi-
nation with knowledge about potential actions stored in
memory. A good perceptual performance would support
either of these two latter possibilities, and it would under-
mine our hypothesis that accurate perception of catchable-
ness is only possible on the basis of vertical optical accel-
eration conjoint with (other) perceptual information about
the running actions of the catcher. An attempt was also
made to find out which variable—distance or the to-be-
developed velocity or acceleration—best captures the tran-
sition from catchable to not catchable, both in actual catch-
ing and in the perception of catchableness. It was expected
that, with respect to actual catching, acceleration would do
best. With respect to perceptual judgments, any of the three
variables was deemed possible as the best predictor of the
judgments.
Because in general it appears that experienced athletes are
more accurate than novices in responding to skill-specific
information (Abernethy, 1990a; 1990b; Abernethy & Rus-
sell, 1987; Jones & Miles, 1978; for an overview of differ-
ences between experienced athletes and novices see Aber-
nethy, 1994) and to increase the likelihood of having
participants skilled in perceiving the catchableness of fly
balls, this experiment tested both expert outfielders and
nonexperts. If judgments of catchableness are based on
stored knowledge, then differences are to be expected be-
tween nonexperts and expert outfielders because the quality
of stored information, amount of stored information, or both
ought to be different in both groups. If, on the other hand,
judgments are based on vertical optical acceleration, then,
due to a lack of specification of catchableness, equally poor
performance is to be expected for both groups.
Method
Participants. Twelve male observers, 6 nonexperts and 6 ex-
pert outfielders, participated in the experiment. On average the
expert outfielders had 15 years of competitive baseball experience
(range = 7-21 years). One of the outfielders played in the Major
Leagues in the United States. The remaining 5 played in the
Netherlands: 3 in the professional league and 2 one league lower.
The nonexperts did not have any baseball experience, although a
few had experience in other ball sports such as table tennis, tennis,
and soccer. The average age of the entire group was 27 years
(range = 22-44 years). All participants reported normal or cor-
rected-to-normal vision. They were paid a small fee for their
participation.
Design. The observers were tested in two conditions, a per-
ceiving-only condition and an actual catching condition, always in
that order, to prevent observers from using actual catching perfor-
mance to make perceptual judgments. In the first condition, the
task of the observers, who remained stationary, was to indicate as
quickly as possible whether a ball could be caught if they had been
allowed to run freely. In the catching condition, the task of the
observers was to attempt to catch the balls before the bounce. In
each condition 60 balls were projected preceded by 10 practice
trials. Half of the balls landed in front of the observer and half
landed behind him, in random order. The distances to which the
balls were shot were adjusted according to observers' performance
(in catching and judging) to ensure that both categories (catchable
and not catchable) were sufficiently populated.
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Experimental setup. The experiment was carried out in a gym-
nasium (height = 9 m), where a machine shot tennis balls from
behind an opaque screen (height = 1.2 m) toward observers (see
Figure 2). The balls, projected in the sagittal plane of the observer,
had near parabolic flight trajectories and landed either in front of
or behind the observer's initial position. The initial machine-to-
observer distance was 18 m.
The trajectories of the balls, along with the movements of the
observer-catcher, were videotaped at 50 Hz with two cameras, one
S-VHS Blaupunkt camcorder and one Panasonic camera con-
nected to a S-VHS Blaupunkt video recorder. Both cameras were
set up perpendicular to the plane in which the balls were shot, in
such a way that together they covered the entire length (40 m) and
height (9 m) of the gymnasium (see Figure 2). To obtain identical
time codes in the images of both videotapes an external sync and
a time code generator were used.
Procedure. In the perception-only condition the observer was
instructed to move his arm forward if he judged a ball catchable
and backward if he judged a ball not catchable. He was told to do
so irrespective of where the ball eventually landed, in front of him
or behind him. Both the distance the ball traveled and the time the
ball was in flight were manipulated. Flight time was varied by
shooting the balls to three different heights: the maximum height
possible without contacting the ceiling (about 8 m high), approx-
imately 75% of this maximum height (about 6 m high), and
approximately half this height (about 4 m high). The first 36 balls
were projected to a range of 7-12 m in front of the observer and
4-9 m behind the observer, evenly divided over the three possible
flight times. We used different distances to make the two condi-
tions comparable; catchers can cover more distance per unit time
running forward than backing up. The order of the first 36 balls (18
in front, 18 behind) was randomized. On the basis of the responses
to the first 36 balls, the experimenters determined which distance-
time combinations should be used for the remaining 24 balls (12 in
front, 12 behind) to ensure sufficient numbers of judgments in each
category. One of the experimenters each time indicated when the
next ball was about to be projected.
In the catching condition the first 18 balls landing in front were
projected in the range 3-12 m. The catchers were allowed to run
freely from the initial position (18m from the point of projection).
The remainder of the procedure was similar to that of the catch-
ableness condition; ranges were adjusted such that the transition
from catchable to not catchable was somewhere in the middle. As
a result, the ranges used in the two conditions could differ both
between and within observers.
Results and Discussion
For all throws in both conditions the distances between
the initial position of the observers and the landing positions
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of the balls (where the balls were caught or could have been
caught, thus not where they hit the ground) were determined
from the videotapes. These running distances (Ds) are the
distances the observers ran (or would have to run) to catch
the balls. The flight times of the balls were also determined
(to an accuracy of 20 ms, related to the frame rate of the
video).
In our first analysis we attempted to determine which
variable (distance, velocity, or acceleration) best captured
the transition from catchable to not catchable in each of the
two conditions. The responses of the observers in the catch-
ableness condition (judged catchable or not catchable)2 and
in the catching condition (caught or not caught) were plotted
as a function of three variables: running distance (D), run-
ning distance over time (D/T), and running distance over
time squared (D/T2); representative examples are shown in
Figure 3.
Twelve such plots were obtained for each participant, the
combination of two conditions (judging and catching), two
landing position possibilities (in front and behind), and
three variables (D, D/T, and D/T2). Using a least squares
iterative fit procedure, the best possible logistic function
(see Bootsma et al., 1992; Peper et al., 1994) was fitted onto
each of these plots to measure the critical points and the
slopes at these points. The logistic function is represented
by the following equation:
y = (D
where x is the variable (D, D/T, or D/T2), c is the critical
value of x at which the transition from one type of response
(catchable or caught) to the other type of response (not
catchable or not caught) occurs, and k is a measure of the
slope at point c. Examples of the fits can be seen in Figure
3, in which the dashed lines represent best fits. Correlation
coefficients of the fits were also computed.
Both the slopes and the correlation coefficients give an
indication of how abrupt the transition is from one type of
response to the other. The steeper the slopes and the higher
the correlation coefficients, the more abrupt the transition
(i.e., the less variable the responses). Presumably, the pre-
dictor variable (either D, D/T, or D/T2) that best captures
the transition from catchable to not catchable should pro-
duce the least variable response pattern—steeper slopes and
higher correlations. Because the slopes obtained with the
different variables have different units (either m, m/s, or
m/s2), they do not permit comparison. Therefore, to test
which variable suits the data best the correlation coefficients
were used. To normalize the distribution of the correlation
coefficients Fisher Z transformations were computed.
Once the best-fitting variable(s) is established, one can
Figure 2. A schematic (side view) representation of the experi-
mental situation. The perceptual condition is depicted in which an
observer responded by moving his left arm (visible on video)
forward or backward.
2
 Recall that the task of the observers was to respond as quickly
as possible. Movement initiation times of the responses (also
gathered from videotape) revealed that observers tried to do this.
On average, the nonexperts and experts initiated their responses
after 786 (SD = 231) and 712 (SD = 130) ms, respectively; the
difference was not significant, F(l, 10) = .53. Taking into con-
sideration that flight times were about 2 s, responses were, at least,
initiated well before the balls landed.
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Figure 3. Graphic representation of the responses of one observer with respect to balls landing
behind him plotted against D (running distance), D/T (running distance over time), and D/T2
(running distance over time squared). Zeros indicate balls not caught (or judged not catchable); Is
indicate balls caught (or judged catchable). Responses in both the catching behind (left) and the
catchableness behind condition (right) are depicted. The dashed lines represent the best-fitting
function to the data (see text for details).
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compare the critical values of the catchableness and the
catching condition for each observer to determine how
accurate the observers were in judging whether the pro-
jected balls were catchable.
Goodness of fit. A 2 (Expertise [experts, nonexpert]) X
2 (Landing Position [front, back]) X 3 (Variable [D, D/T,
D/T2]) X 2 (Task [catching, judging]) repeated measures
analysis of variance (ANOVA), with expertise as the only
between-subjects factor was performed on the Fisher Z
values of the correlation coefficients. It revealed that the fits
were better in the catching (Z = 1.40) than in the catch-
ableness condition (Z = .81), F(l, 10) = 47.01, p < .001;
these Z values correspond to R2 values of .78 and .45,
respectively. Predictably, the transition from catchable to
not catchable is more abrupt and less variable in the actual
catching situation than in the perceptual judgment situation.
There was a significant effect of variable, F(2, 20) =
8.86, p < .005. The variance accounted for by acceleration
(R2 = .69, Z = 1.20) was significantly higher than that
accounted for by distance (R2 = .54, Z = .94), indicating
that acceleration, as predicted, better captured the boundary
of catchable and noncatchable than distance. Newman-
Keuls post hoc analyses revealed a difference between the
velocity correlations (R2 = .67, Z = 1.16) and those of
distance (p < .01), but not between velocity and accelera-
tion. The significant interaction of variable with task (catch-
ing vs. perceiving only) indicated that the superiority of
acceleration and velocity held only for the catching condi-
tion (F = 5.81, p < .05). As can be seen in Figure 4,
distance alone was just as good a predictor in the perceptual
condition as velocity or acceleration. In real catching, the
transition from catchable to not catchable appears to incor-
porate time, as the physics of the situation would predict,
but no such superiority is seen in the perceptual condition.
Expertise was not a significant factor in any of the above
analyses; neither the perceptions nor the actions of the
outfielders were less variable than those of the nonexperts.
Critical values. The perceptual (catchableness) critical
values were scaled to the actual (catching) critical values by
taking the ratio of the two. This was done for distance,
velocity, and acceleration. All of the analyses yielded the
same results. We present only those for acceleration, given
the physics of the situation and the goodness-of-fit results
indicating that the threshold for catching was most reliably
related to acceleration. Table 1 presents these ratios. Perfect
perceptual performance would have resulted in ratios of 1.
Values greater than one mean that the observer indicated
that he could catch balls his actual catching performance
indicated he could not; values less than 1 indicate the
converse. Most of the observers, nonexpert or expert, were
not very accurate in judging the catchableness of the balls.
In both groups there was one observer who indicated he
could catch balls that required almost twice the acceleration
he was actually shown to develop during catching. Four of
the 12 observers had scaled critical values close to 1; the
others were at least 15% off. Comparison with the scaled
critical values that were found in studies with "geometric"
affordances makes clear that performance found here is
considerably less accurate. All scaled critical values of
1.7 j
1.5 - -
1.3 - -
1.1 - •
0.9--
0.7-- Catching Catchableness
CONDITION
Figure 4. Relative quality of the fits of distance, velocity, and
acceleration for the conditions in Experiment 1. The higher the
Z values, the better the fit.
previous research fall within the range 0.8 and 1.2, even
those that are considered inaccurate (Bootsma et al., 1992;
Carello et al., 1989; Konczak, Meeuwsen, & Cress, 1992;
Mark, 1987; Mark et al., 1990; Mark & Vogele, 1987; Peper
et al., 1994; Warren, 1984; Warren & Whang, 1987).
Table 1 also shows that there was a large difference
between scaled critical values for balls landing behind the
observers and those obtained for balls landing in front of
them. Again, this is true for both the nonexperts and the
experts. A 2 (Expertise) X 2 (Landing Position) repeated
measures ANOVA on the scaled perceptual critical values
was performed. The difference between balls landing be-
hind and balls landing in front was indeed significant, F(l,
10) = 10.94, p < .01. The mean scaled critical value for
balls landing in front of the observers is 1.31, whereas the
mean is .73 for balls landing behind them (see also Table 1).
Thus, whereas on average the catchableness judgments in
front were characterized by a considerable overestimation,
the behind judgments showed a more or less equal under-
estimation. It is not clear to us why this difference between
back and front judgments occurred.
As was to be expected from Table 1, there was no
significant effect of expertise, F(l, 10) = .004, indicating
that the expert outfielders were not different from the non-
experts in judging catchableness. So even the average base-
ball experience of 15 years did not provide outfielders with
the ability to judge catchableness of these balls accurately
when they have to remain stationary. To make sure that a
possible expertise effect was not obscured by the fact that
scaled critical values above 1 canceled out values below 1.
A 2 (Expertise) X 2 (Landing Position) repeated measures
ANOVA on the absolute error percentages from 1 was
also executed. However, no effect of expertise emerged,
F(l, 10) = .045.
To reiterate, the correlation coefficient data suggest
that acceleration is the critical variable determining the
transition from catchable to not catchable, though not un-
equivocally (because acceleration fits were not statisti-
cally better than velocity fits). The correlation coefficient
data also show that perceptual judgments of catchableness
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Table 1
Scaled Critical Values (Ratios of Perceptual and Actual
Catching Critical Values) With Respect to D/T2 for Each
Nonexpert and Expert in Experiment 1
Nonexperts Experts
Participant Front Back Front Back
1
2
3
4
5
6
M
SD
1.31
0.69
1.47
1.51
0.66
1.83
1.25
0.43
0.93
0.99
0.59
0.59
1.21
0.39
0.78
0.28
1.24
1.44
1.50
1.90
0.97
1.15
1.37
0.30
0.76
0.54
1.01
0.75
0.80
0.20
0.68
0.25
reflect time poorly. With respect to the boundary of
catchableness, stationary observers are not very accurate
in judging whether a specific fly ball is catchable, not
even when the observer is an expert outfielder. Thus, it
appears that stationary observers cannot instantaneously
determine whether they could run to the interception point
in time to catch a ball before the bounce. Information
specifying the catchableness of a ball is either not avail-
able to, or not detected by, stationary observers. As indi-
cated earlier, vertical optical acceleration relative to a sta-
tionary observer does not provide the observer with the
necessary information about the boundary of catchable-
ness. It now appears that stationary perceivers do not suc-
cessfully rely on other information, either other perceptual
information or information stored in memory, to deter-
mine whether or not a ball is catchable.
Experiment 2
We contend that the failure of stationary observers to
perceive the catchableness of fly balls is due to the ab-
sence of information about and relative to the observer's
potential and required actions. Without such information,
catchableness of balls landing in the catchable to not
catchable transition area is not specified and, as is sup-
ported by the results of the first experiment, there is no
reason to believe that this information is stored some-
where in memory or available otherwise when the ob-
server is stationary. Experiment 2 examined whether
judgments of catchableness improve when observers are
moving, that is, when information about the observer's
actions is also directly available.
Because Experiment 1 revealed that experts were no
better than nonexperts in perceiving catchableness, Experi-
ment 2 used nonexperts only. In addition, rather than asking
observers to classify a ball as rapidly as possible, we sought
tighter control on their visual exposure. Viewing time was
limited by occluding vision.
Method
Participants. Twelve male participants (with no competitive
baseball experience) participated in the experiment. Their average
age was 24 years (range = 18-33). All participants reported
normal or corrected-to-normal vision. They were paid a small fee
for their participation.
Design. The observers were tested in three conditions. Each
condition consisted of 10 practice trials and 30 experimental trials.
The first condition, the stand condition, is comparable to the
perceptual judgment condition of Experiment 1. The observer was
standing still at the initial position and he was not allowed to
locomote. The observer wore Plato liquid crystal display (LCD)
spectacles that could be shut and opened with good (3-5 ms)
temporal precision. The glasses were normally transparent. One
second after the ball was projected, the glasses shut. The observer
then had to indicate, verbally this time, whether the projected ball
would have been catchable, had he been allowed to run freely.
Certainty ratings were also given as one of three possibilities: very
certain, certain, and uncertain. The LCD glasses remained opaque
for 4 s, after which they became transparent again. The second
condition, the move condition, differed from the stand condition in
one important way: the observer started to run as if he were trying
to catch the ball; again the glasses closed 1 s after ball release. In
the third condition, the catching condition, the observer's task was
to catch the balls before the bounce. This catching condition was
always the last condition, whereas the order of the other two
conditions was reversed with every new observer. To make con-
ditions as comparable as possible, the catchers also wore LCD
spectacles in the catching condition, but they remained transparent.
Experimental setup. Because of the wire trailing from the LCD
glasses (thus, for the sake of safety), it was decided to project all
balls in front of the observer. Although this eliminates the uncer-
tainty about the proper direction in which to run, it does not
jeopardize the comparison between judgments in the stand and the
move conditions because there is no reason to believe the three
conditions would be differentially affected.
The experiment was executed in the same gym as the first
experiment. Tennis balls were machine-projected from behind an
opaque screen (height = 1.2 m) toward the observers (see Figure
2). Balls were again shot in a sagittal plane. The observer's initial
position was 25 m from the ball projection machine (though for
two observers it was later adjusted; see Procedure).
The landing or catching locations of the balls were videotaped at
50 Hz with one S-VHS Blaupunkt camcorder connected to a
S-VHS Blaupunkt video recorder. The camera was set up perpen-
dicular to the plane in which the balls were shot. With help of the
Alpermann & Velte Time Code 30 generator, a Vertical Interval
Time code (VIT code, a unique time code) was written into the
invisible part of each of the fields of the videotapes with an
accuracy of 20 ms. The onset of each ball flight was made visible
on videotape by an ongoing light emitting diode (LED) that was
triggered by the passage of the ball through a slotted Opto Switch
(comprising an infrared source and integrated photo detector) at
the end of the barrel of the ball projection machine. The delay
between passage of the ball through the Opto Switch and the first
video frame in which the LED was on was also registered in
milliseconds by an M-24 Olivetti personal computer. The ongoing
LED, the LCD glasses, and the Opto Switch were all connected to
this computer.
Procedure. During the practice trials, balls were projected ac-
cording to a simple staircase method to get a rough approximation
of where the transition was from one kind of response (judged
catchable or caught) to the other kind of response (judged not
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catchable or not caught). During the experimental trials balls were
shot to various distances from the tentative critical point that was
obtained, roughly from 5 m in front of this point to 5 m behind this
point with steps of 1 m. Three balls were projected toward the
critical point itself, two balls were projected to each of the dis-
tances 1 m from the critical point, and to each of the remaining
distances (2, 3, 4, and 5 m from the critical point) one ball was
shot. For 2 participants, the tentative critical points of the two
perceptual conditions were such that it was necessary to move
them 4 m backward so that in those conditions their initial distance
to the point of release was 29 m; for an additional observer this
was the case in the stand condition only.
The flight time of the balls was manipulated by projecting them
to two heights, the maximum height possible without contacting
the ceiling (about 8 m) and approximately 75% of this height
(about 6 m). In total 30 experimental balls were projected in each
condition. The 30 distance-time combinations were randomized
within condition.
On each trial, one of the experimenters indicated that the next
ball was about to be projected. During the entire experiment
observers wore earplugs to deter them from using auditory infor-
mation to learn about actual bounce location; however, the sound
was not completely shut off.
A frame-grabber and digitizing program determined all neces-
sary variables from the videotape. The pixel coordinates of the
landing or catching locations of the balls were stored and later
translated into real-world coordinates using the Direct Linear
Transformation method (see, e.g., Miller, Shapiro, & McLaughlin,
1980; Shapiro, 1978). On the basis of the VIT codes and registered
time delays the flight times of the balls could also be obtained. In
the move condition, the head positions of the catchers after 1 s
(when the glasses shut) were also measured.
Results and Discussion
The determination of the boundary of catchable and non-
catchable in the two perceptual conditions, stand and move,
was done using six ratings (instead of just two responses,
catchable and not catchable, of Experiment 1). Each com-
bination of response and certainty rating was given a value,
catchable/very certain = 5, catchable/certain = 4, and so
on, until, not catchable/very certain, which was given the
value zero. These ratings were again plotted against the
three variables D, D/T, and D/T2, and fitted to the following
equation:
Stand
y = (2)
which is equal to Equation 1, except that the numerator is 5
(instead of 1), representing the maximum value a combina-
tion of response and certainty rating could adopt. In Figure
5 two representative examples are presented in which re-
sponses are plotted as a function of D/T2 and the best fits are
depicted by the dashed lines. The fitting in the catching
condition was, of course, identical to that of Experiment 1
because the data were dichotomous; plots of the catching
performance (caught or not caught) as a function of either
D, D/T, or D/T2 were fitted according to Equation 1. Per-
ceptual critical values were scaled to the actual catching
M
a
1
§
I
5 -
4 -
3 -
2 -
1 -
0 -
0.5 1.0 1.5 2.0 2.5 3.0 3.5
D/T2
Move
5 -
4 -
3 -
2 ~
1 -
0 -
0.0
1
0.5 1.0
I
1.5
D/T2
2.0 2.5 3.0
Figure 5. Graphic representation of the response ratings of
one observer plotted as a function of D/T2 for both the stand and
the move conditions of Experiment 2.
critical values. The obtained scaled critical values and the
correlation coefficients of the fits were analyzed.
Goodness of fit. A 3 (Variable) X 3 (Condition [stand,
move, catch]) repeated measures ANOVA on the Fisher Z
values of the correlation coefficients of the fits revealed a
significant main effect of variable, F(2, 22) = 4.53, p <
.025. As in Experiment 1, better fits were found for accel-
eration (R2 = .81, Z = 1.48), compared with distance (R2 =
.75, Z = 1.31). Again, the velocity correlations (R2 = .80,
Z = 1.44) also differed from the distance correlations but
not from those belonging to acceleration (Newman-Keuls
post hoc analysis, p < .05).
In contrast to the first experiment, no effect of condition
was revealed; the fits for the catching condition (R2 = .84,
Z = 1.57) were not significantly better than either the stand
(R2 = .73, Z = 1.27) or the move condition (R2 = .78, Z =
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1.39). However, a comparison of the two experiments is
confounded by the fact that the perceptual conditions in
Experiment 2 were fitted to six response ratings (the com-
bination of responses with certainty ratings), whereas actual
catching had just two responses.3
Another important difference with Experiment 1 is that
the interaction between the factors variable and condition
was not significant in this second experiment, F(4, 44) =
.014. In the first experiment it appeared that better fits on
the basis of acceleration and velocity were only found in the
catching condition. In the perceptual condition Fisher Z
values were about equal for distance, velocity, and acceler-
ation (see Figure 4). Figure 6 shows that in the current
experiment the differences between acceleration and dis-
tance and between velocity and distance fits are existent in
all three conditions, indicating that in this case perceptual
judgments, too, reflected both distance and time.
Critical values and error percentages. To determine
whether judgments of catchableness differ in the stand and
move conditions, the scaled critical values (perceptual val-
ues divided by actual catching values) were examined.
Again, critical ratios of all three variables showed the same
pattern of results, so we present here only those based on
acceleration (see Table 2).
The absolute error percentages from 1 (| scaled critical
values —1 | X 100%) were computed for each observer in
each condition and analyzed with a paired t test. The dif-
ference between the accuracy in the stand condition (per-
centage error = 36.8) and the move condition (percentage
error = 20.1) was significant, r(ll) = 2.71, p < .025. On
average, the percentage error decreased by almost half when
observers were allowed to run in the direction of the future
landing location of the ball prior to making judgments about
its catchableness.
Locomotion in the motion condition. To investigate the
basis of the above difference, we examined how far observ-
ers actually ran in the 1 s the ball was visible. This was only
possible for 10 of the 12 participants (the 2 who were
moved to 29 m from the ball machine were not visible on
video). On average, the 10 observers were 1.82 m away
from their initial positions when the glasses closed (SD =
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Figure 6. Relative quality of the fits (Z values) of distance,
velocity, and acceleration for the three conditions—stand, move,
and catch—in Experiment 2.
Table 2
Scaled Critical Values With Respect to DfT2 for Each
Participant in Each Condition in Experiment 2
Condition
Participant Stand Move
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
M
SD
1.49
1.32
1.69
1.30
1.28
0.87
1.64
1.51
0.94
1.44
1.08
1.47
1.34
0.26
1.24
1.37
1.24
1.08
1.15
1.07
1.38
0.97
1.34
0.90
0.99
1.39
1.18
0.17
.51). This is about one fifth of the average distance that had
to be covered to catch the balls. The average horizontal
distance between ball and catcher at the moment the glasses
became opaque was 15.83 m (SD = .68). Correlation coef-
ficients between the distances that were run in this first
second and the distances that should have been run for
successful catching revealed no relation (r = .13, SD =
.19). Thus, observers did not run further in the first second
with respect to balls landing further away than to balls
landing closer. Nor did the distances run differ between
balls judged catchable and not catchable (1.84 and 1.80 m,
respectively), t(9) = .18, ns.
The fact that observers covered only a small distance
suggests that the improvement in the move condition was
due to the extra information created by the locomotion, and
not to something else (e.g., getting closer to the ball).
Thus, the results are in agreement with the expectation
that when running is permitted, perceptual information
about the observer's actions makes it possible for an ob-
server to judge more accurately whether a ball is catchable.
It further supports the idea that rather than having stored
knowledge about action capabilities, actors determine their
capabilities anew each time they perform an action. Only
when the fly ball catcher is running is information about his
or her actions directly available. It now appears that catchers
can use this information to judge catchableness.
3
 Comparison of correlations coefficients of the fits based on six
ratings with those based on two responses for the perception
condition alone in Experiment 2 revealed that indeed significantly
more variance of the data was accounted for by the fits based on
six ratings (Z = 1.27 for stand, R2 = .73; Z = 1.39 for move, R2
= .78) than by the fits based on two responses (Z = 1.11), r(35) =
2.90, p < .005 for stand, (Z = 1.10), f(35) = 12.71, p < .001 for
move; R2 = .65 and .64, respectively. Thus, the improvement of
the fits in the perceptual conditions between experiments may
explain the absence of a condition effect in Experiment 2.
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General Discussion
Research into affordances is characterized by a search for
reference frames that can be used to scale the environment
in a way that is relevant for perceptions and actions of
animals (Turvey, 1992; see also 1986). In light of the
emphasis of previous affordance research on the linear
dimensions of the animal's body as a frame of reference and
in light of the awareness of the fact that one's own spatial
dimensions may not lay a basis for all affordances, the
present study went beyond the spatial body dimensions into
the domain of kinematic relations. As such, it attempted to
present the animal's actions (with their spatiotemporal char-
acter), rather than the animal's body, as a frame of refer-
ence. The central question was whether it is possible to
perceive affordances involving kinematic relations without
executing the actions relevant for those affordances (as is
the case for affordances for which geometric scaling is
appropriate).
To this end, our experiments investigated the circum-
stances under which perceivers can accurately determine
whether a ball projected in the sagittal plane is catchable.
The catchableness of a fly ball depends both on the trajec-
tory of the ball and on the locomotory and other action
capabilities of the would-be catcher. Therefore, the bound-
ary that separates catchable and not catchable is not a fixed
distance, but a distance-time combination in which distance
grows (at least over some range) as a function of time
squared. In other words, that boundary does not depend on
the leg length or eye height of the catcher per se but on the
running speeds and accelerations he or she can develop. We
found that measures that included time (acceleration and
velocity) were significantly better than one that did not
(distance).
Because the catchableness of balls landing at a distance
can be specified by vertical optical acceleration only when
the catcher is locomoting, we expected that stationary per-
ceivers would not accurately perceive catchableness. The
results of Experiment 1 revealed that stationary perceivers,
both expert outfielders and nonexperts, are indeed poor
perceivers of catchableness. Thus, there is no reason to
assume that observers can use either other optical informa-
tion or knowledge about the action capabilities stored in
memory. The second experiment directly compared judg-
ments of catchableness of stationary and freely moving
perceivers. The results show that running actions prior to
making perceptual judgments about the catchableness of fly
balls improve these judgments significantly. Simply run-
ning toward the ball for a limited amount of time reduces
the error in judgments by almost one half.
In addition to the availability of information, another
factor may have contributed to the better performance in the
motion condition of Experiment 2. Heft (1993) argued that
experiments in which observers make perceptual judgments
often allow for an analytical stance with respect to a
perception-action process that is normally unreflective.
Making perceptual judgments a subsidiary part of another
more inclusive task, he argued, should lead to a better
performance. In Heft's study on the perception of reach-
ability, such an improvement indeed occurred.
In our case, the same may have occurred. The stationary
situation seems more likely than the motion situation to
invite an analytical stance. However, it is probably less
likely that this would occur in Experiment 1 given the time
pressure to respond as quickly as possible; Heft (1993) also
found an improvement of reachability judgments in the
time-limited condition. As an aside, it is interesting to note
that in Heft's subsidiary task condition, in which partici-
pants performed best, participants were moving (they had to
swivel around on the chair to face the marker, the reach-
ability of which had to be judged). Although the movements
of Heft's participants were not the task movement itself
(reaching), contrary to our observers' movements, they may
have provided Heft's observers with additional information
about reachability (see Bingham & Stassen, 1994, for an
account of the importance of head movements for percep-
tion of distances).
What remains to be considered is why judgments, despite
the improvement compared with the stationary condition,
were still about 20% off in our motion condition. A possible
explanation is related to the short-distance run. Initiating
locomotory movements takes about .50 s (Oudejans,
Michaels, & Bakker, in press), leaving about .50 s for
running in the motion condition. In this half, a second
observers must bring vertical optical acceleration to zero
(that is, below the detection threshold) for the ball to be
perceived as catchable. For some balls, those that would
land close to the observer, this change will be realized
easily. For balls landing far away, this would be more
difficult. This leaves a range of landing locations in which
some change in vertical optical acceleration may occur
during the time the glasses are transparent, but that change
will not be sufficient to specify unequivocally whether the
ball is catchable or not. Thus, although vertical optical
acceleration may have changed sufficiently with respect to
some balls, the running time (and therefore distance) was
not (always) long enough to expect it to happen on all trials.
Thus, even in the motion condition, catchableness would
not have been specified on every occasion. As to why the
observers consistently overestimated catchableness, it may
be that the catcher's acceleration itself may have brought
optical acceleration below threshold, even though the criti-
cal velocity had not yet been achieved (see, in the Appen-
dix, the discussion of the contribution of X to optical accel-
eration).
The positive influence on perceptual accuracy of a mere
half second of action makes clear that information about the
environment relative to the observer and his or her actions
has to be available for the observer to perceive the affor-
dances of the environment. In the case of catchableness,
actions are needed to determine where the boundaries of
these actions are, even for expert outfielders. Thus, only
when optical acceleration reflects the combined effects of
ball trajectory and catcher locomotion can it be information
about the ball's catchableness. It is an optical invariant in
which observer and environment naturally come together.
As such it provides a nice illustration of an information
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source in the ecological sense that can be used for prospec-
tive control of actions (Michaels & Oudejans, 1992).
Up to now, we have been concerned with the boundary
between catchable and not catchable, without much atten-
tion to the actions that are separated by the boundary. In this
context it must be noted that the fact that catchableness is
ambiguous when the catcher is standing still is not a prob-
lem for the catcher because, initially, he or she need only
know the direction in which to accelerate. It is only during
the pursuit of the ball that the consequent action categories
are of interest, namely, whether to continue as fast as
possible or to slow down to catch the ball on the bounce. It
would be interesting to investigate how the critical point of
catchableness relates to the transition to catching on the
bounce in the baseball situation to ensure that the batter gets
no more than a single. The difficulty that natural-turf play-
ers exhibit when first playing on astroturf—when the ball
bounces over their heads—indicates that other factors can
determine behavior at the action boundary. In general, the
boundaries between action categories are not exclusively
determined by the demonstrable body-scaled or action-
scaled metric. This is also illustrated by the work of Warren
and Whang (1987), who studied the visual guidance of
walking through apertures. They determined that the ratio of
aperture to shoulder width at which actors start rotating their
body to walk through an aperture is 1.3 whereas, in princi-
ple, with any ratio greater than 1, body rotation is not
needed. Thus, something other than mere shoulder width
determines the action.
A variety of permanent or temporary states (e.g., aging,
disability, fatigue, anxiety) can also affect action boundaries
(e.g., Konczak et al.'s, 1992, demonstration of the effects of
joint flexibility on stair climbing). One can imagine, for
example, fatigue being an important factor for the catch-
ableness of fly balls, in which the boundary may shift
according to the degree of fatigue because of its effect on
running speed. Fortunately, when one has an information
source that informs about the motion of the ball relative to
one's own actions, fatigue (and other state variables, for that
matter) will be "automatically" taken into account. "Invis-
ible" variables are made visible; they need not, therefore, be
considered as additional factors; they are part and parcel of
perceiving the boundaries of action.
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Appendix
Effect of Catcher Acceleration on Optical Acceleration
Optical acceleration is the second derivative of the height of the
center of the ball on a vertical image plane at a unit distance from
the eye. This optical height is the actual height of the ball divided
by its horizontal distance from the catcher. Assuming that air
resistance is negligible, optical acceleration is zero when the
trajectory of the ball intersects the eye of a stationary catcher. The
function and its two derivatives are given in Equations A1-A3,
where v is the optical height and Y(t) and X(t) are the height and
distance of the ball at time t, respectively; dots indicate a differ-
entiation with respect to time, and g is the acceleration due to
gravity.
№ =
Y(t)-X(t) - X(t)-Y(t)
(Al)
(A2)
running at constant velocity, it must be taken into account in the
case of an accelerating or decelerating catcher (or ball, for that
matter). This was not done by Chapman (1968), nor by those who
subsequently explored optical acceleration as a basis for locomo-
tion in catching (Babler & Dannemiller, 1993; McLeod & Dienes,
1993; Michaels & Oudejans, 1992; Tresilian, 1995).
The effect of including X is not trivial. As can be seen in
Equation A3, its inclusion contributes a value equal to the catch-
er's acceleration times Y/X2 to the optical acceleration. Given that
a catcher might accelerate on the order of 2 m/s2 to catch a ball,
say, at a height of 2 m and at a distance of 10 m away, the resulting
addition to optical acceleration would be .04. To illustrate the
consequence of this contribution, Figure Al presents the first
1.5 s of optical acceleration (both with and without the X term
included) of a ball with flight characteristics roughly equal to those
y(f) =
[g • X(t) -X(t) • Y(t)] • X(t) - 2 • X(r) • [Y(t) • X(t) - X(t) • Y(t)]
X(t)3
(A3)
When the (constant) horizontal velocity of the ball, X is appro-
priate to cover the distance, X, between the ball and the catcher in
the time that the ball is in the air (i.e., the ball lands at the catcher),
the vertical velocity of the ball on the image plane is constant;
Equation A2 reduces to the following:
y =
-g
2 - X - (A4)
The optics of the situation generalize to that of a moving catcher:
X becomes the relative velocity of the ball taken with respect to the
catcher. This generalization lays the basis for the Chapman strat-
egy—that observers should run in such a way as to zero out optical
acceleration, as described also in the text of this article. Unfortu-
nately, there is an error in this formulation. Whereas the X term
drops out of Equation A3 when the observer is stationary or
§
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Figure Al. Vertical optical acceleration as a function of time
with (closed dots) and without (open dots) the X term included
(see text for details).
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used in the current experiments (a flight time of 2 s, initial distance
from the catcher of 20 m, and a ball travel of 18.3 m). The
computation assumes that the catcher accelerates at 2 m/s2 after a
reaction time of .25 s and continues to accelerate (so that the
catcher actually overruns the ball). The two lines start to split at
.25 s when the catcher'/zpickjpermnew^;! begins the accelera-
tion. Notice that the optical acceleration line for the solid dots,
which include X, reaches zero considerably earlier (about .25 s)
than the line for the open circles, which reflects only momentary
velocity and not acceleration.
The fact that optical acceleration will be zero before the time
that the catcher reaches the velocity appropriate for catching need
not necessarily create problems for the catcher, given reaction time
and the reappearance of optical acceleration when the catcher's
acceleration stops; thus, we have not included the contribution of
the catcher's acceleration to optical acceleration in the text of our
article. Nevertheless, it needs to be taken into account by models
of control laws that relate optical acceleration to the variables of
action, such as that of Tresilian (1995).
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New Editors Appointed, 1998-2003
The Publications and Communications Board of the American Psychological Association
announces the appointment of five new editors for 6-year terms beginning in 1998.
As of January 1, 1997, manuscripts should be directed as follows:
• For the Journal of Experimental Psychology: Animal Behavior Processes,
submit manuscripts to Mark E. Bouton, PhD, Department of Psychology,
University of Vermont, Burlington, VT 05405-0134.
• For the Journal of Family Psychology, submit manuscripts to Ross D. Parke,
PhD, Department of Psychology and Center for Family Studies-075, 1419
Life Sciences, University of California, Riverside, CA 92521-0426.
• For the Personality Processes and Individual Differences section of the
Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, submit manuscripts to Ed
Diener, PhD, Department of Psychology, University of Illinois, 603 East
Daniel, Champaign, IL 61820.
• For Psychological Assessment, submit manuscripts to Stephen N. Haynes,
PhD, Department of Psychology, University of Hawaii, 2430 Campus Road,
Honolulu, HI 96822.
• For Psychology and Aging, submit manuscripts to Leah L. Light, PhD, Pitzer
College, 1050 North Mills Avenue, Claremont, CA 91711-6110.
Manuscript submission patterns make the precise date of completion of the 1997 volumes
uncertain. Current editors, Stewart H. Hulse, PhD; Ronald F. Levant, EdD; Russell G.
Geen, PhD; James N. Butcher, PhD; and Timothy A. Salthouse, PhD, respectively, will
receive and consider manuscripts until December 31, 1996. Should 1997 volumes be
completed before that date, manuscripts will be redirected to the new editors for consider-
ation in 1998 volumes.
